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The year 1989 proved to be one of monumental importance for the Soviet 
Union, the countries of Eastern Europe, and the entire international 
community At the beginning of the year, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
found only limited support among the political elites of Eastern Europe for 
his conception of political reform Only the communist party leadership in 
Poland and Hungary could be viewed as committed reformers Elsewhere, 
the concept of reform received little more than lip service (in Bulgaria), was 
generally criticized (m Czechoslovakia and the GDR), or was most strongly 
condemned (in Romania) Even m Poland and Hungary the pace of reform 
was slow and seemed on the verge of stalling By the end of the year, a 
Solidarity government ruled Poland, the Berlin Wall had fallen, Ceausescu s 
dictatorship had been overthrown m Romania, and a world-renowned 
dissident playwright, Vaclav Havel, had been elected president in 
Czechoslovakia Revolutionary change—in the full sense of the term 
revolutionary —was in process throughout the region, as the basic 
structures of domestic political power (including the formal institutions of 
governance) as well as the structures of the European inter-state system were 
radically changing
Only four times during the past two centuries have events of such 
importance for the nature of domestic and international political 
relationships occurred in Europe 1) during the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic wars, when France attempted to destroy the old political order 
and replace it with a French-centered system of nominally democratic states, 
2) after the defeat of Napoleon m 1815, when the old order was in large part 
reestablished by the victors, 3) after World War I and the collapse of the 
traditional European empires and their replacement by a number of small 
states m Central Europe and a regime in Soviet Russia committed to 
revolutionary change, and 4) after World War II when the geographic and 
political map of Europe was changed once more by the collapse of traditional 
European states and the emergence of the USSR and the United States as the 
dominant actors in Europe and the world The changes initiated during 1989 
promise to have consequences comparable to those associated with the four 
earlier periods of revolutionary restructuring
Though the economic and political tensions of forty years of Soviet 
domination, autocratic rule by local communist elites, and economic 
mismanagement and corruption were increasingly apparent throughout 
Eastern Europe, there was little overt evidence in early 1989 that events of 
such import were about to occur—though social pressures were building that 
would explode later in the year Central to the dramatic changes throughout 
the region that resulted, by the end of 1989, in the establishment of Eastern 
Europe s first non-communist governments since the 1940s, was the new 
attitude of the Gorbachev leadership toward the area In the past, any 
movement toward reform met with strong Soviet resistance By 1989, the
2Soviet government had shifted to the point where it encouraged reform and 
was even willing to accept the reality of expanded pluralism and the demise 
of communist dictatorships as the price for economic efficiency and political 
stability in the region, and enhanced long-term stable political and economic 
relationships with the West
Yet, the radical changes that occurred in Eastern Europe during the last 
six months of 1989 must be viewed within the overall framework of state 
socialism as it was institutionalized in the area and the recent emergence of 
autonomous social groups that developed m the Soviet Union in the 1930s 
under Stalin and in Eastern Europe In the late 1940s, state socialism 
consisted of a highly centralized economy that emphasized heavy industry, 
authoritarian political structures meant to ensure political control by 
miniscule and illegitimate communist party elites, and a strong dependency 
on patron-client relationships between the USSR and the smaller communist 
states of Eastern Europe However, almost immediately after Stalin s death m 
1953 and throughout the ensuing years, evidence mounted that demonstrated 
both the political and the economic weaknesses of the system Sporadically 
and unsuccessfully until 1989, attempts were made in various parts of the 
countries concerned to reform portions of the state socialist system inherited 
from Stalin
After the signing of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, organized 
movements committed to the protection of political and human rights were 
active (and under pressure) in a number of European communist states 
Usually, these groups based their demands for political reform on the 
commitments made by their governments in Helsinki and on the guarantees 
of the constitutions of their respective states
Evidence also mounted throughout much of the region concerning the 
stagnation of economic growth and the fact that the socialist economies were 
falling behind their capitalist counterparts, including those of the East Asian 
NICs, in the development and adaptation of modem technology to the 
production process In addition, the inability of the state to meet implied 
social commitments—i e , the growing shortages of consumer goods and 
housing, the inability to halt the degradation of the environment, etc — 
contributed to increased dissatisfaction with the existing political system and 
to the demand for major political change that would extend effective political 
participation beyond the narrow circle of the communist party elite
Even before the emergence to political prominence of Mikhail 
Gorbachev and new thinking in the USSR, evidence existed of a growing 
awareness of the fundamental nature of the problems facing communist 
states, the imperatives of initiating economic and political reform, and the 
expanding flexibility m relations between the USSR and its European allies 
Thus, prior to spring 1985 when Gorbachev was elected the new head of the
3Communist Party of the Soviet Union the situation throughout much of the 
region was ripe for political change However, only since 1985 have the 
efforts at reform expanded to the point where one can speak of the 
dismantling of key elements of the traditional state socialist system—from 
the dominance of central planning to the emergence of officially sanctioned 
pluralism and the decline of the dominant role of the communist 
nomenklatura
The major concern of this study will be to provide a background and 
overview of developments throughout Eastern Europe that have contributed 
to the dramatic changes currently underway in the entire region—especially 
the importance of the emergence of autonomous interest groups for political 
reform—and to relate those changes to developments within the USSR itself 
Given the importance of and the differences m developments in individual 
countries, we shall deal briefly with each of the countries m turn—beginning 
with those with the strongest and most visible recent tradition of reform, 
Poland and Hungary, and concluding with Romania which, prior to the 
revolution of December 1989, was ruled by a most adamantly Stalinist 
leadership It is essential to keep m mind that we are observing and 
attempting to assess a process of change and reform that is m midstream, that 
the events of 1989, for example, are but part of a process Whether stable 
pluralist, democratic political systems and effectively functioning economies 
will emerge from the current chaos into which traditional state socialist 
systems have fallen, is not at all clear
Poland
The irony of Poland is of a society that has probably moved the furthest 
toward genuine political pluralism, despite the crackdowns and imposition of 
martial law in 1981-1983 Moreover, it has been Poland which, to a 
substantial degree, served as a stimulus to (or, at least, catalyst for) reform 
elsewhere m Eastern Europe Autonomous societal initiatives for reform had 
begun long before Solidarity became synonymous with Polish opposition In 
the pre-Solidarity years, analysts identified three mam currents from which 
society would press reforms on state authority intellectuals and students, 
industrial workers, and the Catholic Church While relatively isolated from 
each other, these interests achieved a degree of convergence during periods of 
systemic crisis at the top, as in 1968-701 In 1968, students and intellectuals 
presented demands for greater freedom of expression, but remained isolated 
from workers, while m 1970-71 workers struck en masse for economic 
demands and confronted state suppression without the support of the 
intellectuals and students 2 As the economic and social situation worsened 
throughout the country, the center of gravity of reform shifted from limited 
circles of intellectuals to a broader social strain involving thousands prepared 
to engage in public protest What occurred during this period was the gradual 
evolution of a social movement which shifted its strategy from attempting to
4influence the system by exerting pressure from within the party, to an 
emphasis on social pressure from outside designed to transform the 
relationship between state and society 3
The worker strikes of 1970-71 were brought about in part because of a 
decline in real wages and a general neglect in living standards Indeed, some 
analysts contend that Poland suffered crises of identity, penetration, and 
participation, most severely, of all the European socialist countries 4 While 
these crises escalated during the 1970s, numerous organs of direct democracy 
were founded, such as the workers councils in Szczecin which proved 
troubling to authorities since they could never be brought under complete 
control By the mid-1970s, a significant number of autonomous avie 
organizations such as the Workers Defense Committee (KOR), came into 
being because existing official institutions had failed to realize their objectives 
and clearly could not meet citizen needs It was up to new groups to limit the 
state s decision-making power and to introduce innovation into the social 
system 5
Because of the extensive development of autonomous social groups 
over the decades, Poland remains the laboratory par excellence for observing 
the relationship between system performance and societal initiatives for 
reform Scholars have catalogued a bewildering array of autonomous 
associations derived from pluralist elements in society, such as the three 
currents noted above 6 In the Solidarity Period of 1980-81, a full range of 
societal interests and groups developed a successful coalition strategy of 
consolidated pluralism that mobilized the majority of society against the 
regime 7 This effort had the direct impact of diminishing the preeminence of 
the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) as the leading and guiding force m 
Polish society in the years following the suppression of Solidarity 
Subsequent efforts to promote a political dialogue between non-party interest 
organizations and PUWP-sponsored associations such as PRON, failed— 
made all the worse by steadily deteriorating economic conditions
Until 1986-87 there was at least some discernible weakening of 
opposition efforts, as the number of independent activists declined markedly 
after the lifting of martial law and the issuance of an amnesty for political 
prisoners Yet, pluralist ideals and hoped-for reforms were at an all time high 
among citizens 8 The veritable explosion of civic activity in 1988-89 was no 
less than the direct outcome of a seriously weakened state with disastrous 
economic problems including a severe slide in living standards and an 
increasingly well organized and determined civil society which not only 
survived the crackdown of 1980-81, but benefited from the party s tarnished 
image In fact, the opposition in the post-1981 period had become 
considerably diversified, with at least four key tendencies identified 9 the 
legitimacy trend which wanted to continue the Solidarity movement, the 
realistic opposition which emphasized expanding the sphere of freedom, the
5political radicals who emphasized winning national sovereignty and building 
a democratic system, and the church-oriented opposition These categories 
serve as a rough means to typologize the hundreds of new groups that 
emerged m Poland in 1987-1989 10
It is scarcely surprising that by January 1989, the PUWP Central 
Committee had passed a pluralism resolution amidst heated debate and 
apprehension of officials that the leadership s new strategy of legalizing 
independent trade unions could prove to be suicidal11 Less than a month 
later, Politburo members began deliberating the prospects for a multiparty 
system, where the PUWP might give up its leading role if ousted by a 
legitimate successor 12 While the regime did not define clearly what type of 
alternative party would be considered legitimate, some officials expressed 
the desire for competing socialist parties vying for the voters favor in free 
elections Nonetheless, a variety of parties representing different ideological 
positions either appeared or, in the case of pre-communist parties, attempted 
to reestablish their existence From nationalist-oriented organizations like 
the Polish Independence Party to the resurrected Polish Socialist Party, a 
clearly multi-party spectrum had emerged to challenge the PUWP s position 
Other, more narrow, autonomous interest organizations joined those already 
in existence, representing a broad spectrum of views and programs 
Environmental groups, such as the Polish Ecological Party, joined existing 
organizations like Freedom and Peace to advocate environmental reforms 
These efforts had a discernible impact on policy making, m 1988, Freedom 
and Peace collected over two thousand signatures in Gdansk to protest the 
building of the first Polish nuclear power station at Zarnowiec, resulting m 
government officials reassessing the projects viability13
Another important development m 1989 which spurred reform efforts 
was the establishment, by independent groups, of umbrella organizations that 
could defend them more effectively against the state Government officials 
agreed to accept the establishment of separate public groups to deal with 
economic problems, a tacit admission of the party s failure to respond 
adequately to the continuing economic stalemate 14 The economic 
associations would operate alongside the existing semi-private and private 
enterprises already flourishing in Poland and they would emphasize the 
importance of capital investment and market principles These initiatives, 
along with many others including recently-concluded negotiations between 
the regime and Solidarity, were taken by organized citizens, and not by local 
officials, elites, or specialists
In Poland, more than m any of the other East European countries, the 
spontaneous growth of independent activity and its gradual politicization 
have been fueled by the failure of a highly centralized system A 
delegitimized communist leadership would offer nothing to stem the
6growing tide of demands from autonomous interest groups aimed at pushing 
the country in a pluralist direction with a functioning parliamentary system
Unlike the then-hardline regimes of East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, however, Poland s relationship with Gorbachev s USSR was 
convivial to the extent that the Soviets showed much more understanding of 
the complexity of the Polish situation The Jaruzelski leadership was less 
concerned about the spillover effects of Soviet reforms than with the positive 
endorsement that such reforms lent to Poland s own efforts15 Gorbachev was 
praised for showing energy, boldness, and farsightedness in pursuing 
reforms and also for taking a realistic stance about the nature and limits of 
intra-bloc relations Until Jaruzelski stepped down from power, however, 
there were no overt gestures of concern about the prospects for substantial 
economic and political instability in the immediate future Moscow 
remained calm during the roundtable discussions between the Polish 
government and Solidarity that led to the legalization of the independent 
labor movement and the electoral reforms of spring, 1989
The June election stood as the most far-reaching manifestation of the 
reform process m Eastern Europe until the upheavals of fall, 1989 In terms of 
formal political power the reforms were meant to limit the power of the 
opposition The elections for the newly-established 100-seat Senate were 
entirely free, while only 35 percent of the 460 seats for the Sejm or lower 
house, were filled through competitive contests The results, however, 
proved a stunning defeat for the ruling Polish United Workers Party PUWP 
candidates failed to wm a single seat where there was a contested race 
Solidarity candidates took all but one of the seats lost by the PUWP and 
received an average of 70 percent of the total popular vote Moreover, all but 
two of thirty five key PUWP figures who ran unopposed, failed to gam the 
required majority of the votes cast to ensure réélection Government efforts 
to limit the impact of the new electoral system failed largely because the 
voters were able to strike off so many officials from the ballot16
Over the summer, much political jockeying occurred before the 
emergence of a Solidarity-led government in September In July, the issue 
was the selection of a new president Only after once withdrawing from the 
race and pushing the candidacy of Interior Minister General Czeslaw 
Kiszczak, was General Jaruzelski eventually elected president on 19 July by 
the margin of a single vote After his election to the presidency, Jaruzelski 
fulfilled an earlier pledge by resigning as head of the PUWP Though the 
communists successfully pushed General Kiszczak through parliament as 
prime minister, he failed in his efforts to form a grand coalition government 
and on 24 August, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was elected prime minister 
Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual with extensive political experience, had 
played a major role m the creation of Solidarity in 1980 He was editor-in-
7chief of Tygodmk Sohdarnosc, the communist bloc s first fully independent 
weekly
After decades of the most intense and tenacious opposition activity m 
the region, the Poles had broken the political dominance of the communist 
party For the first time since World War II, Poland has a non-communist 
prime minister and a true coalition government—but one faced with 
imminent collapse of the economy and problems of generating effective 
public support for economic reform politics
Hungary
In Hungary, the path toward reform has differed from that taken m Poland or 
elsewhere m the region, complicated by the now-diminishing economic 
prosperity brought about by Kadansm in the wake of the 1956 revolution 
and Soviet military suppression The democratic opposition in Hungary 
was largely confined to a handful of intellectuals who did not engage m 
creating or advocating the establishment of rival political parties or other 
institutional challenges 17 Recent economic problems led to an evaluation of 
the need for political reforms to supplant the secret corporatism of the 
Kadar period While the former party leader spoke of the need for autonomy 
within a one-party system, some officials argued openly that only Western- 
type pluralism with multiple parties would represent a real improvement18
Scarcely a decade before, however, analysts generally agreed that the 
likelihood of well-entrenched political elites suddenly opening the floodgates 
to admit average citizens into the privilege of autonomous decision-making 
m politics and economics, seemed remote at best19 Yet, even then, 
Hungarians, such as philosopher Gyorgy Markus and sociologist Andras 
Hegedus, were openly expressing the necessity of pluralism m a Marxist 
system While the government gradually began to tinker with political 
mechanisms such as multi-candidate elections in 1985, some analysts began to 
discuss the serious possibility of real political pluralism Party officials 
categorically rejected competitive, Western-style pluralism, using the 
historical justification that Hungary had evolved as a one-party system and 
what was needed was recognition of a plurality of interests 20 Given that 
multi-candidate systems were already established m Poland and Romania and 
had not resulted m a challenge to party control, it appeared doubtful that the 
opposition could use the electoral changes to effect a political breakthrough
In the early 1980s, spurred by an international climate of tension 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, a burst of opposition activity 
had occurred in Hungary that focused on peace and disarmament issues 
Spearheaded by the Peace Group for Dialogue, a movement involving a 
handful of autonomous peace groups, this activity challenged the official 
Peace Council s legitimacy and involved relatively large numbers of citizens
8in anü-nuclear activities 21 Dialogue was forced to disband in 1983, after 
refusing to merge with the Peace Council, a host of lesser groups either 
followed Dialogue s example or were absorbed into official institutions
Until recently, this was the pattern of societally initiated reform activity 
in Hungary A handful of dissident intellectuals would organize around a 
specific set of issues and disband relatively soon thereafter By the mid-1980s, 
however, concrete social initiatives reappeared from what dissident Gabor 
Demsky called suspended animation 22 Acknowledging that the various 
groupings in society did not yet know what to demand, he noted the fact that 
independent groups were undertaking large-scale tasks traditionally within 
the responsibility of official social institutions These included supporting 
refugees from neighboring Transylvania, offenng legal aid to citizens, and 
attempting to create some sort of organization dedicated to the protection of 
workers and young peoples interests Indeed, as m Poland, the 
development of parallel institutions was unprecedented in the wake of 
inertia and creeping incompetence of official institutions
Many of these initiatives were resurrected efforts at grass-roots citizen 
impact on policy making In 1981, an autonomous environmental group, the 
Danube Circle, was created in Hungary to articulate public outcry over the 
proposed diversion of the Danube between Gabcikovo in Slovakia and 
Nagymaros in Hungary as part of an immense hydroelectric project While 
the government expressed its own reservations about the project, its 
hesitation led to the Danube Circles collecting some 10,000 signatures by 1986 
Facing severe government disapproval for operating outside the official 
sphere, the group disbanded in 1986, prompting some writers to posit that 
such citizen activity is doomed to failure, both in Hungary and throughout 
Eastern Europe By 1988-89, however, activity resumed m cooperation with 
two other groups, the Danube Foundation and the Nagymaros Committee 23 
The renewed effort collected over 100,000 signatures, was endorsed by 
nineteen members of parliament, and eventually, by summer 1989, forced the 
government to halt the project 24
Despite some harassment, the controversial Federation of Young 
Democrats (FIDESZ) achieved the status of an officially recognized alternative 
to the Communist Youth League (KISZ) The group was first declared illegal 
for advocating a multiparty system and a free market economy, but 
persistence and an increasingly large nationwide membership guaranteed its 
new legal status 25 Moreover, at its first national congress in November 1988, 
the group joined a newly created umbrella organization, the National 
Council of Youth Organizations in Hungary, which served as a channel for 
shared information and a forum for discussion among Hungary s 
independent youth groups While the council also included the official 
group KISZ, it was understood that no one group would have authority over
9another, and relations between the official and independent groups would 
remain minimal 26
Across Hungary some thirty or more new organizations were 
established with aims ranging from support of glasnost to the reestablishment 
of Western-style democracy As in Poland, Hungarian civil society found 
expression m new and old political parties, as well as protective umbrella 
organizations The independent Smallholders Party and the Social 
Democratic Party are but two of the opposition parties which will compete 
with the recently renamed Hungarian communist party in the 1990 
elections 27
More important from a reform perspective, have been the communist 
party debates surrounding the status of multiple political parties Although 
memory of the brief reemergence of pre-war parties of 1956 left officials 
understandably concerned, many now admit that it is impossible to assert that 
parties are categorically forbidden 28 Many of these parties plan to run 
candidates in the 1990 elections and, barring a drastic crackdown which is 
increasingly unlikely, the impact of resurgent multiple parties may 
demonstrate the inability of the Hungarian Socialist Party (the renamed 
ruling party) to continue its dominance much longer The real test will come 
in early 1990, when citizens will have an opportunity to choose between 
alternative programs of competing candidates
In both Poland and Hungary, well-organized, broad-based autonomous 
organizations now function as the government or a loyal opposition, and 
fully open multi-party elections are scheduled for the near future As we 
shall see below, the situation throughout the rest of the region is quite 
different, for political change has been far more convulsive and has lacked 
much of the gradual development over time of well-organized groups that 
represent political alternatives to the ruling communist parties
German Democratic Republic
Analysts have long held that of all the East European regimes, the German 
Democratic Republic was most willing and able to withstand opposition 
political initiatives either from within the party or from society In the midst 
of the the initial social upheaval and political turmoil of 1989, the aging, 
hardline Honecker leadership appeared to be in the strongest position to 
maintain its decision-makmg hegemony Yet, as regional events took a 
course of their own, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was, m a matter of weeks, 
transformed from the dominant political force in society to a splintered, 
disintegrating institution in the wake of a massive upswelling of opposition
From May 1971 until October 1989 the Honecker regime had 
successfully resisted all attempts at fundamental political change from within,
10
as well as overt suggestions for liberalization from the Gorbachev 
administration While the scope of the events of 1989 was unprecedented, 
the coalescence of initiatives for reform was not entirely unpredictable
After taking power from Walter Ulbricht m 1971, the Honecker 
leadership was subjected to a variety of social, economic, and political strains, 
which analysts tended to downplay while emphasizing the successes of the 
GDR economy What was unique about the pressures faced by East Germany, 
was the increased influence exercised by the Federal Republic of Germany as a 
result of the opemng up of travel and the impact of the media As the detente 
of the 1970s drew East and West closer economically, the two German states 
concluded a whole series of agreements, the most important of which was the 
Basic Treaty of December 1972 29 These agreements meant recognition of the 
East German state by the Federal Republic, but they also opened up East 
Germany to influences from the West The implication for the GDR was 
increased economic, political, and cultural penetration by its economically 
more powerful and politically more legitimate neighbor The majority of East 
German citizens received both East and West German radio and television 
programs and have generally been better informed than most of their Eastern 
bloc neighbors 30
For example, the Western media ensured that the GDR had an 
alternative source of information about the Polish events of 1980-81 As the 
PUWP acknowledged the workers right to strike and to form independent 
trade unions, as well as to question the principles of democratic centralism, 
the SED tried to exploit anti-Polish sentiments Despite this effort, the GDR 
did experience clashes between young demonstrators and the police, as well as 
minor strikes and protests in support of Solidarity 31
Moreover, already by the mid-1970s the vaunted East German economy 
was running into problems Where economic reports for the first half of the 
decade had showed healthy annual growth rates, dramatic price increases for 
the energy supplies imported from the USSR were apparent by 1975 The 
targets for growth in the national economy, set in the five-year plan for 1976- 
80, were not achieved, and living standards failed to rise in line with popular 
expectations Analysts noted the potentially troubling implications of the 
SEDs being unable to justify this aspect of the GDR social contract, whereby 
the party guaranteed the people a secure existence and rising standard of 
living in return for political acquiescence 32
While the potential for discontent and opposition was fueled by these 
developments, the SED made good use of its restrictive provisions, such as its 
ability to restrict freedom of assembly, expression, and press in accordance 
with the basic principles of the constitution In practice this meant the 
option of condemning, as unconstitutional, any individual or group activity 
of which it disapproved and taking legal action against East German citizens
11
who grouped together to demand that their constitutional rights be 
observed 33 Elections to the East German parliament, the Volkskammer, were 
designed to limit the voters choice to candidates selected by the National 
Front, which embraced all accepted parties and mass organizations and which 
accepted the leading role of the SED Party resolutions were binding on all 
political groups in the GDR, the presence of party representatives as 
watchdogs at all levels of the state, and mass organizations also helped to 
ensure that party resolutions were put into practice While criticism and self- 
criticism within the party was encouraged officially, it was by and large 
manipulated to reaffirm the leading role of the Communist Party under 
Honecker 34
Against the backdrop of rigid centralization from above and increased 
influence of the outside political environment, a minor wave of extra-party 
opposition developed in the early 1980s, spearheaded by dissident 
intellectuals and an unofficial peace movement under the auspices of the 
Evangelical (Lutheran) Church Internal criticism of the GDR by such notable 
figures as Robert Havermann, Rudolf Bahro, and Stefan Heym drew 
attention to the confrontation of East German society with a state apparatus 
which determined what would be produced and how it would be allocated 
There was by no means consensus among this opposition, for example, 
arguments diverged concerning the issue of the Prague Spring of 1968—did it 
represent an adequate model for reform, or should it have gone further than 
it did35
Far more important was the organization by 1982-83, of a network of 
autonomous peace groups that was the largest in Eastern Europe and capable 
of turning out large numbers of citizens for events organized independently 
of the state The development was in large part stimulated by the presence of 
a mass disarmament movement in the FRG, and by what was perceived as 
the increased militarization of East German society Under protection of the 
Evangelical Church, the peace movement spread throughout the country and 
engaged in opposition activity m spite of state pressure and coercion During 
1982 and 1983 organized protests, meetmgs, petition campaigns, etc, became 
commonplace In February 1982, the Dresden Peace Forum drew some 5,000 
activists to its first demonstration, while other protests spread to Weimar, 
Potsdam, Leipzig, and Berlin the next year 36 In 1983 authorities cracked 
down on the thriving peace community in Jena, deporting most of its 
members 37 While some anti-nuclear activity continued, particularly through 
the Evangelical Church, a further crackdown m 1988 forced many more 
activists to emigrate
Scarcely one year later the GDR would undergo the greatest social 
upheaval in its postwar history, as massive citizen protests led to the 
dissolution of the SED-dictatorship in a matter of weeks—a pattern which 
would be repeated in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia The dizzying pace of
12
events took analysts by surprise 38 Yet the crackdown on dissident groups m
1988 precipitated a steady buildup in social tension, rather than constraining 
it In the local elections of 7 May, for example, peace activists and human 
rights groups reemerged to momtor vote counting, while organizing protests 
against the electoral system m Leipzig, which would become the hotbed of the
1989 opposition activity 39 More significantly, throughout the country a rapid 
increase m public dissatisfaction was registered in an all-time non-voting low 
of 17 percent40 At the same time, more and more petitions were being sent to 
the Honecker leadership by citizens previously unconnected with opposition 
activism 41
The catalyst for the next phase of the opposition reform movement 
was the beginning of the mass emigration during the summer of 1989, which 
further indicated the SED s resistance to both economic and political reform 
Despite continued harassment of newly forming opposition groups and party 
reformists like Dresden party leader Hans Modrow, the opposition began to 
broaden its appeal and organize a nation-wide network By September, an 
umbrella organization calling itself the New Forum had been established that 
tried unsuccessfully to obtain recognition as an independent political party 42
Throughout October an escalating systemic crisis was aggravated by 
several key developments 1) a rapidly growing and increasingly effective 
opposition network throughout the country, 2) an increased level of social 
tension as demonstrators and police fought in the streets, and 3) a 
deteriorating economy made worse by the exodus of an estimated 200,000 
people, many of whom were skilled workers The number and size of the 
opposition groups swelled to encompass a broad spectrum of society, thus 
approaching the level of coalescence that occurred in Poland during the late 
1960s and early 1970s By mid-October, Honecker was forced to resign by the 
Politburo amid rumors of an impending police massacre of citizens Under 
the leadership of new party chief Egon Krenz, the emphasis on reform shifted 
from when to how The ability of the SED to assuage the restive 
population depended crucially on how much power Krenz would surrender 
to genuine political reformers at regional and district levels
Mass resignations from the SED of both leaders (including Krenz, who 
was replaced by Gregor Gysi) and rank-and-file members, coupled with the 
appointment of Hans Modrow to be the prime minister in December, 
smoothed the way for discussion of real reforms, although they did not halt 
the party s dwindling membership 43 What was especially interesting was the 
level of reform sentiment within the party, as Krenz misjudged the mood of 
the SED district committees and the rank and file More troubling was an 
opinion poll which found that the SED would get only nine percent of the 
vote m the free elections promised for spring 1990—implying that half the 
SED s 2 2 million members (or ex-members) would vote for another party 44
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While the embattled coalition government in Berlin faced growing 
demands for radical reforms in the political sphere (including reunification 
with the Federal Republic), the format for economic reform began to emerge 
which would include decentralization of decision-making, price reform, the 
restructuring of the huge combines into more competitive smaller 
enterprises, the welcoming of Western capital and joint ventures, and the 
introduction of market forces 45 The new electoral law and the holding of 
multiparty elections as soon as possible will undoubtedly entail major 
structural changes in the GDRs political system Meanwhile, in the short 
term, the GDR must deal with the possibility of a splintering political system 
in which no effective political organization emerges to take control m the 
wake of the collapse of the dictatorship of the commumst party
Czechoslovakia
In Eastern Europe s second major hardline state, where the greatest increase 
m independent activity was registered in the fall of 1989, the 1968 experience 
stands as a clear watershed m postwar experiments with economic and 
political pluralism In the spring of 1968, there occurred a veritable 
awakening of mass associations, interest groups and non-communist political 
parties as official organizations disintegrated or divided into new 
autonomous organizations Pluralist Socialism became the byword of the 
Czechoslovak People s Party, the Czech Socialist Party, and the National 
Front, all of which advocated giving citizens real choice between different 
political forces ”46
The general consensus among communist party intellectuals of the 
desirability of a limited pluralism confined within the framework of the 
party s leading position was initially regarded as a better way to achieve 
democratization than more radical proposals Radical opimon won out by 
March 1968, however, as social groups outside the circle of intellectuals 
exerted greater influence What began as latent tensions gradually led to a 
powerful coalition of social forces interested m extreme change in the 
bureaucratic-egalitarian order, which culminated m a radical political 
outburst of social and cultural crises
As in East Germany, however, the impetus for reform m 1968, as well 
as in 1988, came from the intellectual sector of society As indicators of 
economic growth declined markedly in the years preceding the 1968 crisis, the 
regime began to rely increasingly on the advice of economists both inside and 
outside the party apparatus 47 Yet, at the same time, the short-lived Dubcek 
regime made every effort to channel and control mass energy within the 
leadmg role of the Communist Party 48
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With the Warsaw Pact invasion and the enunciation of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, a number of analysts posited the near total erasure of all vestiges of 
a pluralist political culture in Czechoslovakia 49 Moreover, the dominant 
national political-cultural orientation of the great majority of the 
Czechoslovak people was, as late as 1989, hypothesized to be a participatory- 
subject culture, where ordinary citizens must be obedient to their rulers 
demands and must also comply with their instructions 50 While reformist 
elements within and outside the party were subject to purges, harassment, 
and trials through the mid-1970s, the nexus of opposition, the intellectual 
sector, remained active While given little more than periodic passing 
attention, their survival and activity proved crucial to the rapid turn of 
events in November-December 1989, as they had proved to be in 1967-68
While still in the process of shelving the Dubcek leadership s 
economic and political reforms one by one, the Husak regime, throughout 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, was faced once again with the same economic 
problems that first provoked systematic reexamination of the centralist 
model an outdated and inflexible economic structure, declining efficiency of 
investment, acute tensions m supplies of raw materials and labor and their 
inefficient use, an increasingly alarming technological lag, and chronic 
problems m foreign trade 51 The reticence that the leadership showed in 
addressmg this situation was paralleled in other areas as well 
Czechoslovakia achieved the dubious honor of being the northern European 
country worst hit by catastrophic environmental problems As a result of 
heavy and inefficient use of cheap brown coal in industry and energy 
production, by 1983 some 25 percent of all forests were dead or dying, and one 
third of all watercourses were too polluted for industrial use 52
In response to this series of systemic crises, the first serious organized 
societal initiative, Charter 77, was formed in 1977 at the behest of 240 
intellectuals The dissident group suffered from high member turnover rates, 
and its repeated attempts to orgamze national opposition networks were 
largely unsuccessful Yet several leading members of Charter 77, such as the 
playwright Vaclav Havel, would play a vital role in the 1989 events 
Throughout the long Husak tenure, the group spawned a wealth of cultural, 
publishing, human rights, peace, and ecological activities m addition to an 
impressive array of documentation on these issues 53 With regard to peace 
and environmental issues, the group established ties with movements m 
other Eastern European countries during the mid-1980s 54
As the aging Husak leadership grew increasingly unable and unwilling 
to address fundamental economic and social problems, and to suppress 
thoroughly the growing opposition, a third source of pressure came from 
without in the form of Soviet leader Gorbachev s glasnost and perestroika 
strategies Even before the crucial 27th Soviet Party Congress in 1986,
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Czechoslovak leaders had expressed their concerns about the turn of events 
in Moscow Presidium leader Vasil Bil ak warned of disrupting the system 
of political power of the working people and reiterated the correctness of 
the 1968 Soviet invasion and subsequent purge of the party 55
Yet, m the midst of an increasingly tense social climate, signs emerged 
of differences within the leadership concerning the way to move into the 
Gorbachev Era and deal with the growing opposition Premier Lubomir 
Strougal in 1987 praised Gorbachev s frank and innovative approach to all 
issues and claimed, in contrast with Bil ak, that the 1968 reforms had 
contained a number of correct and valuable elements 56 For his part, 
Gorbachev reaffirmed the theme that would, in 1989, lead to the public 
repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and to the assertion that each Eastern 
European party be responsive to its own people, and the right to decide in a 
sovereign manner how each country should develop 57
Thus, a situation similar to that of 1967-68 took a significantly different 
turn, as it became increasingly clear to the Husak leadership, and then to that 
of his successor Milos Jakes, that it was more or less on its own and could 
not count on direct Soviet support Taking advantage of this changed 
climate, new opposition groups (like the Initiative for Social Defence, the 
Thomas G Masaryk Association, and an incipient umbrella organization, the 
Democratic Initiative) joined Charter 77 m pressmg the reform process 58 For 
its part, the government grew increasingly schizophrenic, internal reports of 
the CCP m May 1988 praised Charter 77 and other groups for providing a 
forum for youth, while simultaneously, the government cracked down on 
their meetings and forced the Democratic Initiative to suspend its activities 
for several months 59
Throughout the spring and summer of 1988, however, the situation 
intensified to the point where, despite the governments periodic hardline 
tactics, the number of demonstrations, protests and new groups seeking 
recognition continued to rise dramatically To make matters worse from the 
point of the regime, in the wake of several large demonstrations in Prague m 
October, CPSU Politburo member Alexander Iakovlev visited the country and 
lectured Czechoslovak party officials on the need for a plurality of views 60 
By early 1989 it had become clear that divisions now existed in the leadership 
over the issue of reform On 25 January, Presidium member Jan Fojtik 
warned that the public influence of opposition groups was increasing at a rate 
to which the government could not respond, while reform had lagged 
substantially 61
By November, Czechoslovakia was m a new phase of reform, the most 
extensive since 1968 The impact of developments m Poland in the spring 
and m the GDR by late summer, contributed to the growth of autonomous 
political activity and the growing demands for reform Similar to the
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Honecker regime, the Jakes administration proved to be unable to cope with 
opposition that had grown nation-wide and with internal divisions that 
resulted m a clear lack of direction In a matter of weeks, the opposition s 
emphasis shifted from applying pressure to a hardline government that was 
brutally cracking down on demonstrators in late November, to debating the 
relative merits of Alexander Dubcek and Vaclav Havel for the presidency By 
early 1990, the long-time dissident Havel had been elected president, while 
Dubcek, the former party leader, was selected as leader in the revitalized 
parliament
As occurred in East Germany, an ideologically rigid regime proved 
unable to withstand the combined impact of declining economic and political 
performance, rising opposition and pressure, and lack of support from the 
Soviet political leadership Yet the opposition that had emerged to challenge 
the dommant role of the communist party was not as effectively organized as 
that m Poland
Bulgaria
While the Western media s attention was riveted to events m Poland, 
Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1989, fundamental 
change was transpiring in Bulgaria that largely went unnoticed Yet the 
historical affinity of this Balkan nation for Russia and the Soviet Union 
would have a major impact on the emergence of political pluralism at the 
decade s end The initial statements and slogans of glasnost which emanated 
from the USSR in 1987-88 and emphasized a cautious path to 
democratization, were echoed in the Bulgarian media m 1988-89 While the 
aging Zhivkov leadership continued to maintain a tight rein on the domestic 
political environment, extensive debate developed quickly on freedom of the 
press, artistic creativity, and the establishment of parallel associations in the 
political arena 62
Yet, as in the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian leadership s initial lip- 
service to the idea of glasnost opened the window for a range of autonomous 
reform initiatives from society An environmental movement emerged to 
protest the catastrophic pollution of the town of Ruse by a caustic soda works 
on the Danube Activists from the Citizens Committee for the Ecological 
Defense of Ruse initiated a series of demonstrations and petition campaigns 
which led to the plant s eventual closing, as well as to the expulsion of its 
activities from the Communist Party 63 Despite the crackdown on the group, 
it was perhaps one of the first times that Bulgarian citizens outside the 
framework of officialdom had affected a policy decision
Until Zhivkov s sudden resignation in November 1989, the pattern of 
autonomous reform initiatives and the regime s response to them differed 
little from that of the hardline regimes of Czechoslovakia and the GDR
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Throughout the fall of 1988 and the spring of 1989, numerous independent 
groups of several hundred members each, surfaced across the country, each 
with an issue to press on a recalcitrant leadership One of the first, the 
Independent Club for the Support of Perestroika and Glasnost, initiated a 
broad range of proposals which addressed living standards, ecology, 
demographic problems, culture and science while openly remaining 
unofficial to avoid outside patronage and manipulation 64
Authorities responded to the actions of the Club in much the same 
manner that characterized their treatment of other organizations, they 
harassed, arrested, and expelled activists, but stopped short of attempting to 
eradicate it This produced speculation that Bulgaria s leaders were becoming 
responsive to citizens feelings 65 From February through May of 1989, the 
Zhivkov regime adopted the carrot-and-stick approach of cooptation and 
crackdown The government s policy of legal registration for associations was 
aimed at controlling groups, despite the fact that prominent legal experts 
pointed out that the existing Bulgarian legal code did not require groups to 
seek an official registration 66
While groups such as the Ruse Committee, the Discussion Club, and 
the various Green parties were subjected to harassment, the intensive 
persecution was reserved from groups presumed or claiming to have ties to 
the country s Turkish minority, such as the Independent Human Rights 
Association A national policy of forced assimilation of the large minority 
evolved into a virtual pogrom, as ethnic Turks were attacked and driven out 
of the country by the thousands Ethnic Turks and their few non-Muslim 
sympathizers initiated a series of hunger strikes and organized large 
demonstrations which were met with severe police repression The Turkish 
Question became the focus for the regime s non-negoüable demands vis-à- 
vis the populace, and organizations pressing for reform in this area were 
treated far more harshly than their peers whose demands the authorities 
could more easily accommodate 67
By November 1989, a fundamentally new and cunous situation had 
developed, further illustrating the difficulties of Eastern European leaders in 
coopting autonomous opposition groups Opposition groups, spearheaded by 
the Discussion Club, launched a series of actions through the fall, calling for 
fundamental political reform The regime s alarmed and haphazard response 
revealed clear divisions within the leadership, with some Central Committee 
members, and at least one Politburo member loosely allied with the 
Discussion Club 68 This de facto alliance was instrumental in the November 
10 coup which ousted Zhivkov from office following his open reluctance to 
adopt fundamental changes in the political process
The resultant palace coup and the housecleanmg of the communist 
party that followed, paved the way for an explosion of independent
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associations, trade unions, and political parties by January 1990 While the 
reformist commumst leaders gradually gave way, m the face of escalating 
public demands, they committed a serious political error m mid-January by 
calling for an end to anti-Turkish policy—evidence of the negative side of the 
emergence of political pluralism
Romania
In Nicolae Ceausescu s Romania, the reform process began with a whimper 
and ended with the loudest explosion in the Eastern bloc since 1956 Yet, 
even in this most highly centralized East European state, societal opposition 
managed to survive in the face of heavy persecution In 1977, the 
government had been shaken by worker unrest m the Brasov region, which it 
met with force The Gorbachev era touched all of Eastern Europe and, in the 
end, not even Romania was immune to the forces that were released There 
had been attempts at an organized opposition in 1985, as activists met 
clandestinely to discuss the possibility of resurrecting the old pre-war political 
parties 69 Such attempts continued until the December revolution of 1989, 
and were routinely suppressed
By 1987, a handful of other opposition groups had emerged m 
Romania such as the National Peasant Party and the Romanian Association 
for the Defense of Human Rights These groups focused on promoting public 
awareness of and the authorities compliance with the provisions on human, 
civil, and political rights contained in Romania s constitution and in the 
Helsinki Accords 70 While the groups pledged themselves to non-violence 
and to dialogue with the authorities, they also released documents purporting 
to reveal the feudalization of the country under Ceausescu s rule As a 
result, crackdowns m 1987 on such groups silenced them for awhile, as 
leaders were arrested, beaten, and fined
Workers in the Brasov region were the next to press the government 
for reforms in 1987 and 1988 In November 1987, they initiated street 
demonstrations and strikes over cuts in salaries, the continuing decline in 
living standards, and Ceausescu s policy of razing roughly half of the 
country s villages 71 The authorities responded by arresting leaders and 
cracking down on the workers with tanks and tear gas In the summer of 
1988, an embryonic independent trade union, the Zarnesti Arms Factory 
Group, leaked evidence to the West that unrest was again building in this 
weakest point in Ceausescu s kingdom 72 In June, union activists 
disseminated manifestos in Brasov factories protesting living conditions and 
were promptly arrested and beaten by Sucuritate officers Activists attempting 
to resurrect another independent trade union, Freedom, met a similar fate in 
Cluj that summer 73
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As in Bulgaria, however, proponents of reform were not confined to 
isolated groups in society and by the spring of 1989, there were clear signals 
that the Romanian leadership was not a unanimous body At the beginning 
of March, six former top figures in the Romanian Communist Party 
addressed an open letter to Ceausescu, which turned into a scathing 
indictment of the regime s policies and an alternative platform for the 
establishment of a decent social life in Romania 74 At the same time more 
and more party veterans, particularly journalists, came under suspicion for 
treason, and many were arrested, as divisions within the party became 
impossible to conceal Criticism by Romaman intellectuals at home and in 
exile also increased markedly, as letter after letter reached the West 
condemning the stifling political atmosphere m the country and as thousands 
of Romanian citizens, including a growing number of ethnic Romanians, fled 
into exile 75
While opposition grew steadily in the Soviet bloc s last Stalinist 
holdout, the regime adopted increasingly harsh means of quelling it In the 
second week of December, the rolling revolution that had toppled regimes 
in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, came to Romania m the form of 
large-scale demonstrations in the western city of Timosoara Protests which 
began after the police removed a popular Hungarian clergyman, were met by 
a bloody reprisal by Securitate forces which left as many as several thousand 
dead Rather than receding, opposition to the regime escalated and became 
increasingly violent with protests, strikes, and demonstrations spreading to 
the capital and other cities In his last public appearance before a public rally 
oh 21 December, Ceausescu was shouted down by the crowd and forced to flee 
the Presidential Palace, as the armed forces sided with the demonstrators at 
the critical moment
The resultant stunning turn of events left the country in a state of 
virtual civil war, as regular army units battled Securitate forces m the streets 
Ceausescu and his wife Elena were captured, tried m secret and executed in a 
matter of days The regime that could least accommodate autonomous 
initiatives for change was brought down most violently by them
Conclusions
It is by no means clear at the beginning of 1990 where events in Eastern 
Europe will lead, for the revolutionary transformations discussed above are 
still in process and their outcomes are not predetermined 76 It is most likely 
that the processes of change will result in the emergence of political-economic 
systems throughout the region that are not homogeneous In the political 
realm it is conceivable that m some countries, stable, pluralist political 
systems will emerge, while in others the response to political fragmentation 
and semi-anarchy may result in the reimposition of some form of
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authoritarian political controls In the economic realm, mixed economies 
that combine elements of traditional state socialism with market factors will 
probably result, but the mix may well differ substantially from country to 
country Moreover, the degree to which new regimes will be able to resolve 
the fundamental economic and ecological problems which they have 
inherited, will probably differ as well and will likely depend on the degree to 
which they are able to be integrated into the Western economy 77
Though it is not possible at this point to predict with any degree of 
confidence the contours of a post-communist Eastern Europe, one can assert 
that state socialism, as it has existed in the region for more than four decades, 
will not be reinstated, that local communist parties will, at best, play but a 
supportive role in the political and economic reconstruction of the region, 
and that the dominance of the USSR over the Eastern European systems will 
be dramatically reduced, if not fully broken
Several important points emerge from the current analysis First of all, 
the process of revolutionary change that has occurred in all six of the Soviet- 
oriented communist states is interconnected and has common roots Those 
roots can be found in the fact that throughout the entire region, even m 
Romania and Czechoslovakia, emerging social groups placed increasingly 
greater demands for participation on the communist elites who dominated 
the systems At the same time, the internal contradictions of the Stalinist 
socio-economic-political model, with its inability to adjust easily to external 
demands and its virtual ignoring of the costs of industrial production, 
reached crisis dimensions in most countries Authoritarian elites were no 
longer able to suppress these groups nor to ignore their demands, with the 
result that during the last months of 1989, they were displaced
Not only did the revolutions of 1989 have similar origins, but they 
were also influenced by the dramatic changes in Soviet policy toward the 
region and by the demonstration effect of developments elsewhere m the 
region In many ways, Gorbachev s repeated statements that Eastern 
Europeans should determine their own fate and that the Soviet Union would 
not intervene to undermine the process of long-needed political reform 
contributed to the radical political changes 78 This hands off approach to the 
process of political challenges to the ruling party elites m Eastern Europe—in 
fact, Gorbachev openly advocated political reform in some countries— 
contributed to the environment that permitted, even encouraged, those 
advocating political change to press forward their demands more openly The 
fact that Polish Solidarity was successful in challenging Communist Party 
domination, winning an election, and taking over political power—all 
without Soviet intervention—apparently exercised a powerful influence 
elsewhere m Eastern Europe
21
To a great degree, therefore, the dramatic changes that have occurred 
throughout Eastern Europe find their basis in both internal factors (economic 
crises and growing pressures for political participation) and the external 
environment (the shifts in declared Soviet policy and the evidence of 
reformers success elsewhere, as in Poland)
Despite the similarities in the reform process throughout Eastern 
Europe, substantial differences exist as well Perhaps the most important is 
the degree to which alternative political forces had been able to organize prior 
to the developments of 1989 and, thus, the degree to which they represent a 
viable political alternative to the communists In Poland, for example, 
Solidarity, which has a decade of organizing experience, has been able—at 
least to this point—to coalesce to the point where it has formed a 
government, passed legislation, and implemented policy Moreover, the 
Polish communists have virtually disappeared as a viable political force In 
other countries, such as Bulgaria and the GDR, the communists have yet to 
give up effective power, and the opposition has splintered into a multiplicity 
of competing factions Whether these opposition groups will be able to unite 
adequately to wm in open elections scheduled for most countries in spring 
1990, or to form viable ruling coalitions, is a key question Thus, differences 
exist throughout the region concerning both the remaining organized 
strength of the communists and the ability of the opposition to organize 
effectively and wm a working majority in competitive elections
A related problem, most evident already in Poland, is the need for a 
reform government to rely on a communist bureaucracy to carry out its policy 
decisions Will the members of that bureaucracy, long accustomed to the 
perquisites associated with the communist party elite, function as a non­
political civil service willing to carry out policies that diverge strongly from 
those of the past and will the new regimes be able to tram a new non- 
communist civil service7
Yet another issue concerns the willingness of populations long 
repressed and long deprived of material goods to have the patience to accept 
the austerity programs that will be necessary virtually everywhere in order to 
turn around moribund economies—assuming, of course, that the new 
leaderships will be able to agree on programs of economic reform, successfully 
implement them, and then reap positive results
As argued at the very beginning of this essay, events in Eastern Europe 
since mid-1989 are revolutionary in nature In terms of structural changes of 
the state socialist system, they have already gone far beyond anything 
envisaged in Gorbachev s reform program for the USSR Gorbachev has been 
committed to retaining communist party dominance, while expanding 
political liberties, and to making an essentially state socialist economic system 
more efficient and more responsive to public needs The Eastern Europeans,
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however, have moved much beyond those positions The new Polish 
government is already in the process of dismantling portions of the economic 
infrastructure of the old centralized system, everywhere throughout the 
region, coalition governments are now m place, party militias, used in part to 
help enforce party dominance, are being dismantled, and open multiparty 
elections are scheduled for spring 1990 which will no doubt result in the 
overwhelming defeat of the communists 79
Eastern Europe has entered a new era, the contours of which are by no 
means clear Though other factors have been important, as we have 
attempted to document, key to the developments that have led to the 
revolutionary changes that have already occurred and will continue to 
develop, has been the emergence, within the framework of centralized and 
authoritarian political systems, of autonomous groups It has been these 
groups which have challenged the ruling communist elites and forced them, 
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Country Date Type of Election Major Contestants
Hungary 25 March 
1990
parliament which 
will elect a 
president
Hungarian Socialist Party 
(communists) and several 
opposing groups, including 
Hung, Democratic Forum and 
Alliance of Free Democrats
Poland mid-April
1990
local and regional 
governments
Communists, Solidarity, and 
other smaller parties
Romania April 1990* parliament Council of National Salvation 
(ruling group) and various new 
parties
GDR 18 March 
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parliament Communists, four parties 
formerly allied with 
communists, six opposition 
groups, and New Forum
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parliament Communists and Union of 
Democratic Forces (includes 
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will elect 
president
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Public Against Violence, and 
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* In both Romania and Bulgaria opposition parties are calling for delays that will give 
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* * In the GDR the elections were pushed back from May at the demand of the opposition 
Source The New York Times 21 January 1990 p 4 1
